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Nation Building and the Politics of Islamic Internationalism in Guinea: Toward an 




 This article discusses the historical role of Islam in the political evolution of Guinea in the broader 
context of Muslims’ experience of nation/state building and globalization in Africa. This role is examined 
on the premise that Islam is one of the major globalizing forces (more in the body of the paper on this idea of 
Islam as a globalizing force) responsible for the formation of what experts have conceptualized as Africa’s 
“triple heritage” or the juncture of African traditional values, Islamic influence, and the legacy of Western 
colonialism. 
 The article examines Islam’s role in the creation of cultural identities, territorial polities, and 
complex regional and trans-continental networks of trade and scholarship in pre-colonial West Africa; the 
formation of fronts of resistance to European colonial conquest and occupation; and the mobilization of new 
nationalist forces which sparked the national liberation struggle of the 1940s and 50s in the region. 
 The discussion of key concepts such as nationalism, nation/state building, internationalism, and 
globalization exposes the limited applicability of existing theories to the African experience by highlighting the 
complexity of post-colonial cultural reconstruction and nation building on the continent. 
From this perspective, the article focuses upon the political and ideological contradictions having 
marked the relations of the regime of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) under President Ahmed 
Sékou Touré and conservative Guinean Muslim circles in the early years of independence, due in part to 
Touré’s Marxist and socialist leanings of the time. 
 Also comprehensively discussed is this regime’s subsequent ideological incorporation and diplomatic 
use of Islam in an effort to curb anti-PDG opposition at home and abroad and to free itself from isolation by 
the West. Hence, President Touré’s successful policy of “offensive diplomatique” geared primarily toward 
Arab and Muslim nations and organizations but also, though somewhat indirectly, toward Western powers, 
serves as an example of the dynamics of Islamic internationalism in Cold War global affairs.  
 Past experiences of party-centered and state-controlled regimentation of religious organizations under 
Touré’s state-party regime is compared to the current trend of self-decentralization and self-
internationalization of Islamic forces in light of the challenges of religious radicalism and post-Cold War 
politics in Africa. 
 
Introduction 
This article examines the role of Islam in Guinea’s experience of nation building and 
international alliance building from the perspective of Africa’s “triple heritage” (Mazrui 
1986) (i.e. the juncture of African traditions, Islamic influence, and the legacy of western 
colonialism) and in the context of the Cold War world order under which post-colonial 
Africa struggled to find a fitting place. Additionally, the article extends the examination to 
the post-Cold War experience of globalization increasingly characterized by a shift from the 
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hegemony of the nation-state apparatus to the deepening of the porosity of national 
boundaries under the aggressive offensive of transnational forces. 
The discussion evolves from a threefold premise. First, Africa is a place where forces 
of globalization have been clashing with one another for over a millennium inducing, in the 
course of history, far-reaching disturbance in the continent’s indigenous systems. Second, as 
one of those forces of globalization, Islam penetrated Africa in a wide variety of ways, in 
many cases resulting in a relatively balanced symbiosis between endogenous and Islamic 
values. Third, the role of Islam in Africa’s struggle for sovereignty and nation building makes 
Muslim Africa a particularly informative case in the debate on Muslims’ experience of 
globalization. 
As a working concept, “nation building” is, in this study, equated with “statecraft” 
based on the fact that in post-colonial Africa, nation building has, in many regards, meant 
the development of a sense of legitimacy measurable by the degree of political loyalty that 
the state elicits from those under its institutional rule, thus making members of a highly 
cosmopolitan society citizens of an entity called the nation-state.   
Because “contemporary state formation in Africa has been mediated through the 
intrusive erection of the colonial state by European occupants,” as Young and Turner put it 
(Young 1985: 7), and because many existing theories place African nation building in the 
general framework of European perception of nationalism, one can argue that the theories 
apply only partially to the political-cultural experience of Africans. Some of them apply more 
narrowly to the immediate post-World War II national liberation struggle which has lost 
much of its significance to ethnic conflicts and civil wars over the decades. 
Thus, the extent to which William Pfaff’s theory that “Nationalism is connected with 
the absence as well as the existence of nations” (Pfaff 1993: 41) applies to the African 
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experience depends upon how one interprets the argument that nationalism in Africa has 
been connected with the absence of nations while in modern Western Europe it has been 
essentially connected with the existence of nations.  
The same conceptual ambivalence goes for Gellner’s argument that nationalism 
constitutes a theory of political legitimacy in which the coincidence of the territorial state 
and ethnic boundaries is necessary and that a homogeneous superior culture is indispensable 
for the birthing of integrative citizenship (Cottam 2001: 8-10). Rupert Emerson’s definition 
of the nation as “a community of people who feel they belong together in the double sense 
that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a 
common destiny in the future” (quoted in Cottam 2001: 2) may be one of the examples of a 
serious conceptualization strategy of nationalism and nationhood, as some see it. Yet, in 
many respects, it, too, fits only obliquely African nation building. 
Finally, if nothing else, the theory that “A state is a nation state when people identify 
with the territorial unit organized as a political entity, that is, a nation, more strongly than 
with any other politically relevant identity group (racial, ethnic, etc.), and they give the nation 
primary loyalty” (Cottam 2001: 2) may help to explain the fragility of the African nation-
state. This fragility is chiefly imputable to the fact that most post-colonial African polities are 
a legacy of the colonial partition of the continent making the transfer of loyalty from the 
natural comfort zone of kinship to an artificial national state often occasional and uncertain. 
In the final analysis, the historical particularities of the colonization and de-
colonization of Africa and the strong ethnic self-consciousness of African societies represent 
serious intervening variables largely responsible for the pervasive ambivalence with which 
the African nation-state emerged, and due to which many view it as a myth that can show a 
semblance of reality only when considered from the perspective of contemporary statecraft, 
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itself a pervasive legacy of European colonialism. 
This is perhaps what Edem Kodjo means when he indicates that the post-colonial 
African state lives by and for the outside world: “it is from the outside world that it receives 
its concepts and ideas…Whereas the truly independent and sovereign state bases its power 
on endogenous factors, the African state extenuates itself to derive its essence from 
exogenous factors” (Kodjo 1987: 119-120). Basil Davidson shares Kodjo’s pessimism when 
he argues that the African anti-colonial forces and their leaders remain the nationalists 
without nations they were prior to independence (Davidson 1978: 304). Davidson insists 
that the magnitude of these little-anticipated challenges soon made many honest 
hardworking leaders aware of a built-in failure of proto-colonial institutions.  
With the emergence of new doctrines of world order at the end of the Cold War, the  
debate on nation building and globalization has raised complex questions not the least of 
which is whether the two are compatible. The viability of the African nation-states in 
particular, whose emergence on the ruins of colonial empires was once considered a 
revolutionary step towards peaceful coexistence, is being challenged by a new trend of 
globalization conceived as “both an active process of corporate expansion across borders 
and a structure of cross-border facilities and economic linkages” (Herman 1999).   
To truly understand nation building and globalization in post-colonial Africa, 
whether separately or conjointly, one must take into account Africa’s longstanding active 
involvement in world affairs, for as Michael O. Anda puts it, it is incorrect to view Africa 
only as a victim of history, a passive recipient of influences and a bystander in global affairs 
(Anda 2000: 2). In West Africa, this active involvement has resulted in Islam playing a key 
role in the shaping of the region’s societies in the last eight hundred years or so, both as a 
globalizing force and as a factor of nation building.  
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The history of Islam in West Africa has been examined from various angles and the 
present study analyzes a particular aspect of this history along the lines of the works of 
experts such as Nehemia Levtzion (Levtzion 2000), Ivor Wilks (Wilks 2000), David 
Robinson (Robinson 2000), Stefan Reichmuch (Reichmuch 2000), Knut S. Vikor (Vikor 
2000), and Lamin Sanneh (Sanneh 2000) who discuss in depth the role of Islam in the 
construction of Afro-Muslim identities, between the eleventh and the nineteenth centuries, 
in the western portion of the bilad es-Sudan through trade, scholarship, and diplomacy with 
North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Middle East. Claude Rivière (Rivière 1971), 
Lansiné Kaba (Kaba 1974), Jean-Louis Triaud (Triaud 2000), and Ira M. Lapidus (Lapidus 
2000) complete the discussion by examining the political and cultural history of Islam in 
West Africa under French colonial rule.   
What made Islam an integral part of Guinea’s nationalist and global aspirations? 
How did the regime of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) deal with local religious forces 
(Muslim and Christian alike) opposing its original Marxist-socialist pronouncement? What 
was Islam’s contribution to the regime’s political survival and alliance building in the face of 
its isolation by the West since independence? How has the Islamic dimension of the PDG 
political philosophy and diplomatic action influenced post-PDG Guinea’s national 
“reconstruction” and international relations?  
Islam and the Challenge of Nation Building in Guinean History 
With the introduction of Islam in the late eleventh century, a succession of events 
contributed to the opening of Western Africa to the wider Muslim world, including the 
Islamization of rulers of the Mande Empire one of whom, Mansa Musa (r. 1307-1332), was 
given the ceremonial title of Caliph of Islam in the western bilad es-Sudan during his legendary 
pilgrimage to Mecca. From this point onward, as J. C. Froelich points out, the convergence 
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of scholarship, commerce, and politics enabled Berber, Moor, Marka and Arab proselytizers 
to gather fellowship among the rulers and the populace of Western Sudan (Froelich 1962).   
In the seventeenth century, Islamization in the Mande region was closely tied to the 
matrimonial alliances among Mande Mori families, as well as their religious alliance with 
prominent Mauritanian clerics. Further west, the Futa Jallon became, in the late seventeenth-
early eighteenth centuries, another theater of zealous Islamization by ethnic Fulani nomads 
and semi-nomads spreading from Futa Maasina and, in the late-eighteenth century, by ethnic 
Torobhe led by the charismatic Cheikh Omar Tall of Futa Toro. 
As a result, theocratic states emerged in the Mande and the Futa Jallon where holy 
men and veneered families established religious sanctuaries, including Kankan (the Islamic 
metropolis of Upper Guinea), Tuba (founded by the Jakanke cleric El Hajj Salimou Touré), 
Kula Mawnde and Sagale in the Labé (Futa Jallon), and Dinguiraye from which founder 
Cheikh Omar Tall expanded the Tijjaniya Sufi order which, according to Claude Rivière 
(Rivière 1971: 289-295), succeeded fairly easily in supplanting its Qadriyya counterpart in 
most of the Futa Jallon. These Islamic centers established close ties with Sufi circles in 
Mauritania, North Africa and Egypt, thus consolidating Islam’s global network in this part of 
the world. 
However, as Ira M. Lapidus indicates, “At the very end of the [nineteenth] century 
European invaders defeated, subordinated, and broke up existing states and imposed their 
own regimes. Muslim state formation was checked and Muslim peoples became subjects to 
new European-generated political and economic pressures” (Lapidus 2000: 732). As a matter 
of general assessment, the clash of these forces of globalization, viewed by some as two 
opposing systems of imperialism, plunged African societies in general and Muslim Africans 
in particular into an era of greater political, cultural, economic, and spiritual turmoil. The 
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ensuing decades of colonial occupation would affect Muslims’ experience of national 
sovereignty and globalization in a number of ways.  
Like elsewhere on the continent, the curving out of French Guinea valued neither 
the ethno-cultural identities of the natives nor their pre-existing religious and political 
allegiance. Instead, the interests of the colonial powers involved determined exclusively the 
outcome of what was to be a zigzagging partition of West Africa among the French, British 
and Portuguese. Hence, the area named the Rivières du Sud, which had been attributed to 
France in June 1882, by a French-British treaty, was declared a colony on October 12 of the 
same year, and divided into three territories, including French Guinea whose definitive 
borders, however, would take more time to establish. In July 1887, a French-Portuguese 
treaty defined the border between French Guinea and Portuguese Guinea; in January 1895, 
the Guinea-Sierra Leone border was agreed upon by the French and the British; in January 
1911, the French administration and the Liberian government ratified an accord defining the 
Guinea-Liberia border (Rivière 1971: 27; De Benoist 1979: 15-25). In the meantime, in 
October 1899, a French decree had transferred from French Sudan (modern-day Republic of 
Mali) the cercles of Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Kouroussa, Kankan, Kissidougou and Beyla, roughly a 
third of the territory of the modern-day Republic of Guinea (Rivière 1971: 27).   
Fifty-nine years of administrative juxtaposition failed to prepare the ethnic Mande of 
these cercles to adjust to their uprooting from the traditional Mandeba (Greater Mande), or to 
ease religious tensions between the numerous segments of Guinea’s population. So, by the 
time of independence, the country’s ethno-religious entities were far from being culturally 
integrated. These entities consist of the Muslim Mande of Upper Guinea; the Fulani, Jakanke 
and Jallonke (Muslim), Basari, Bajaranke, and Koniagui (mainly animist and Christian) of 
Middle Guinea; the Kisi, Toma, Guerze, Kono, Mano, Lele, Konia (mainly animist and 
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Christian) and Tomamaniya (largely Muslim) of Forest Guinea; the Soso, Mende, Nalu, Baga, 
and Mikhifore (Muslim, Christian and animist) of Lower Guinea. Historically, the relations 
among some of these ethnic entities had been strained by decades or centuries of cultural 
frictions, religious prejudice and political tensions.  
Claude Rivière explains that after having “pacified” them, French colonialism 
induced more subversive division and hostility among these ethno-cultural entities forcibly 
aggregated in the territory of French Guinea. Thus, by transforming traditional chiefs into 
agents of colonial canton chieftaincy (colonial municipality) and by granting self-serving 
privileges to displaced groups over larger autochthonous communities, the French 
administration reinforced ethnic frictions between Nalu and Landuma chiefs, between Fulani 
feudal lords and Jallonke serfs, between Temne koroba (warriors) and Baga of Kalum, and 
between métis of European descent and indigenous Guineans (Rivière 1971: 41).   
This colonial policy of “divide-and-rule” weakened Islamic brotherhood causing 
Muslim leaders of the anti-colonial movement to face internal scissions in their following 
and betrayal from jealous neighbors. As a result of this cultural trauma, post-colonial nation 
building has been a struggle for sovereignty under new identities within the arbitrary colonial 
boundaries. The struggle has been carried on with a variety of means ranging from political 
mythology to deep-rooted cultural and spiritual values, such as Islam.  
The Guinea in which the new political elite endeavored to build a modern nation 
emerged from this background of very limited cultural congruence. Also, the building of a 
national platform in Guinea by the regime of the PDG was further complicated by the little-
anticipated consequences of the dramatic circumstances under which the same party had led 
the country to independence as well as by some of the policies that the new regime adopted 
afterward in an effort to curb the challenges of independence in the midst of political 
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adversity.  
Upon achieving the de-colonization of the country in 1958, the leadership of the 
PDG, which had become the de facto and de jure leadership of the new state, was 
challenged on two fronts. First, the former colonial master belabored to isolate the new 
regime from the remainder of Francophone Africa and the West. Second, despite the 
apparently voluntary merger of former opposition parties into the PDG, just weeks before 
independence, the regime encountered serious difficulties in its attempts to legitimize its 
single-party system of government. The difficulties emerged from a clash over Touré’s 
pursuit of a Maoist brand of party preeminence over the state, a pronouncement strongly 
opposed by right-wingers and vigorously supported by left-wingers in Touré’s government.   
 Caught in this position, Sékou Touré turned to the Eastern Bloc for economic aid 
while resorting to Marxist interpretations of history. As a labor unionist, Touré had 
previously encountered Marxism in the Cercles d’Etudes Marxistes (CEM) which French leftists 
had organized in the 1940s to train “revolutionary elites” throughout the French Empire. 
Also, from 1946 to 1951, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the all-French 
African political movement as a territorial branch of which the PDG was formed in 1947, 
had virtually operated under the shadow of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF).  
However, as head of state, Touré first hesitated to commit the Guinean regime to 
socialism preferring the ambiguous ideology of “non-capitalist development.” Most 
important perhaps, even after the adoption of socialism, he categorically rejected 
communism, basing his view of the socialist path on the “communal” nature of African 
societies in which family, village, and clan are the primordial parameters for any meaningful 
expression and understanding of individuality. Yet, as Lapido Adamolekun has observed, 
Touré’s belief “that the traditional communal living in Africa would make the peasants 
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accept the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, which would gradually develop into 
collective farms” failed to materialize as  “he found that Guinean peasants were unprepared 
to transfer their loyalties to ‘family,’ ‘village’ and ‘clan’ to an artificial group such as 
agricultural cooperatives. The cooperative system which was established collapsed, and most 
Guinean farmers continued their subsistence farming” (Adamolekun 1979: 63).  
Despite Touré’s rejection of communism, the espousal of “Afro-Marxism” brought 
his regime into collision course with the Catholic Clergy and with local Islamic circles. As far 
as the Clergy is concerned, accounts of this collision course are found in the work of 
Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo, first African bishop of Conakry (1962-1970) and former 
political detainee (1970-1979). Downplaying the collaboration between the Catholic Church 
and the colonial administration in Guinea, Tchidimbo condemns the Defferre Law which 
granted semi-autonomy to France’s colonies in Africa and, consequently, democratically 
brought the PDG to power in 1957, with Sékou Touré as vice-president of the Semi-
Autonomous Government Council. Tchidimbo’s contempt to this legislation is based, in 
part at least, upon the allegation that once in power Touré suspended sine die all subventions 
to Catholic schools throughout the country (Tchidimbo 1987: 86). Tchidimbo goes on to 
praise, “by intellectual honesty,” the colonial system for having understood, “—despite 
numerous errors in the exercise of power—that the sphere of personal freedom remained 
and shall always remain beyond the hold of society and government,” before depicting the 
PDG’s nation building effort as a deliberate “socialist-communist” adventure which, “in 
twenty-six years of reign, demolished what had been patiently built in sixty years of 
colonization” (Tchidimbo 1987: 124). One can understand why this clergyman could not get 
along with Touré the nationalist politician.  
Against Tchidimbo’s characterization of the PDG regime as “primitive 
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communism,” which is arguably a reaction to Touré’s decision to expel, in August 1961, 
French Roman Catholic bishop Larb de Mileville who had publicly opposed the 
government’s proposed nationalization of Church schools, it is useful to also recall that 
Soviet Ambassador Daniel Semyonivich Solod was expelled in December 1961, following 
Touré’s denunciation of a Communist plot to destabilize Guinea for its declared non-
alignment.  
Even though Sikhé Camara argued that despite the contradictions having marked the 
Guinean government’s relations with individual members of the Catholic clergy Guinea 
maintained decent working relations with The Vatican (Interview, October 1992), it is no 
secret that the PDG regime’s honeymoon was much shorter with the Guinean Catholic 
Church than with most other spheres of power outside the party-state. But the causes of the 
divorce were more political than ideological and, arguably, go back to the general perception 
which predominantly Muslim societies had developed during the colonial period toward 
Christianity perceived as an agent of European imperialism. This perception grew 
particularly stronger in French Africa where the colonial administration, most often, adopted 
hostile attitudes vis-à-vis Islam. Due to its historical antecedence in these areas and its 
greater adaptability to African traditions, Islam had been accepted as “an African religion” 
and utilized in the resistance to European occupation. Put in the context of the history of 
globalization, this phenomenon epitomizes the clash of agents of globalization responsible 
for the forging of Africa’s so-called “triple heritage.”  
 As for the alleged conflict between Marxism and Islam in Guinea’s nation building 
history, it, too, is not free from controversy. Mamdou Béla Doumbouya, a founding member 
of the PDG and long-time unionist and spiritual leader, downplayed the allegation and 
suggested that even though some traditional chiefs co-opted in the colonial structures 
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stridently accused the PDG of being communist and godless, the party was able to 
demonstrate to the masses that compared to those chiefs it was more faithful to Islam’s 
precepts of freedom, equality, justice and brotherly solidarity (Interview, January 1993). 
According to this interviewee, the fallen aristocracies and formerly privileged canton 
chieftains used the RDA’s initial affiliations with the French Communist Party to 
misrepresent the PDG-RDA as a “godless party.” The PDG-RDA countered by providing 
legal and political support, in high-profile litigation cases, to individual victims of power 
abuse in the hands of canton chieftains, including orphans and widows whose inheritance 
powerful chieftains had confiscated in flagrant violation of Islamic law. 
 Ibrahima Sory Fadiga, former secretary general of Guinea’s National Islamic League, 
concurs and adds that the PDG never attacked Islam. Instead, it denounced individual 
clerics whose teachings and behavior were not only un-Islamic, but they were also contrary 
to the party’s anti-colonialist program. In Fadiga’s opinion, there was nothing special in this 
state of affairs: “It simply reflected the normal course of conflict of authority and conflict of 
interests in societies in profound transformation whereby decadent forces always fight to the 
last minute, sometimes using the most absurd arguments” (Interview, August 1992).  
 Chérif Nabaniou, former minister of Islamic Affairs and former secretary general of 
the National Islamic Council, perceived the matter differently when he argued that even 
though the PDG was never anti-Islamic its policies did nonetheless contradict Islamic 
precepts in key areas of national policy. One such area was the adoption of socialism. “Islam 
advocates neither socialism nor capitalism, and yet the PDG imposed socialism’s 
institutionalized collectivization of property in agriculture and commerce” (Interview, 
September-October 1992).   
 One is inclined to infer from the preceding that the attitude of the PDG toward both 
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religion and Marxism was aimed at establishing the party’s political predominance over the 
different forces competing for power in Guinea in the waning years of the colonial era, 
including the French administration, the old traditional chieftaincies which the same 
administration had turned into proto-colonial structures, and para-political forces whose 
power rested on the manipulation of religion.  
 In fact, under the Socialist Cultural Revolution (SCR) proclaimed in 1968, this policy 
was expanded to include “demystification,” a campaign aimed at neutralizing the marabouts 
(clerics) and at abolishing secret societies of animist initiation and fetishist divination. As I 
have discussed elsewhere (Camara 2005), the principal objective of the SCR was the 
standardization of all aspects of Guinean culture, including but not limited to religion and 
education, according to norms determined in the political program and ideological doctrine 
of the single-party regime in place since independence.  
Diplomatic Offensive and the Politics of Islamic Internationalism 
 The politics of Islamic internationalism under Sékou Touré can be better grasped 
when analyzed from the systemic standpoint of the PDG regime’s theory and practice of 
foreign policy as articulated in President Sékou Touré’s writings from which one notes that 
Guinea’s foreign policy was primarily focused on Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism. In 
1964, the Guinean leader wrote, “But our international policy is not conducted exclusively in 
view of Guinea’s interests. We subordinate it to Africa’s overriding interest” (Touré 1964: 
297). 
To subordinate Guinea’s national interests to “Africa’s overriding interest” and 
conduct a foreign policy accordingly was, in Touré’s view, to hold a dual outlook whose 
justification is twofold. First, “A vertical development in Guinea would indeed inevitably 
result in cutting us off from the African context; hence, irrespective of its quality, it would be 
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extremely frail, since, in making for our isolation, it would weaken us” (Touré 1964: 297). 
Second, “If our development was an isolated phenomenon, if it was to make us retire within 
ourselves, it would not be very dangerous for imperialism and colonialism… Imperialism 
and colonialism desire as a lesser evil the isolation of Guinea, her walling in, which would 
limit the effects of her struggle against their privileges and powers of domination in Africa 
and in the world” (Touré 1964: 198). In the conditions of the Cold War, the PDG regime 
added to this framework that of non-alignment because, in Touré’s view, “To attempt to 
interpret Africa’s behaviour in terms of capitalism or Communism is to ignore the 
fundamental fact that Africa’s present conditions correspond neither to the essentials of 
capitalism nor to those for building up Communism, as generally admitted” (Touré 1964: 
120).  
In retrospect, therefore, it is from the triple perspective of the defense of national 
sovereignty, African unity, and non-alignment that Guinea’s official internationalist 
philosophy and politics under the PDG ought to be considered. Hence, the role of Islam 
ought to be examined as one of many venues in Guinea’s international policy geared toward 
upholding the principles of this triple perspective. 
Even though the mid-1970s is generally considered to be a turning point in the 
political and ideological attitude of the PDG regime toward Islam, it is useful to know that as 
early as the first years of Guinea’s independence, Touré had established close personal and 
political relations with African Muslim leaders such as King Mohamed V of Morocco and 
Presidents Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser of Egypt. But in terms of ideological globalization through Islam, an attentive 
analysis of President Touré’s policy of Offensive Diplomatique officially launched through the 
International Ideological Colloquium of Conakry and the subsequent PDG Eleventh 
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National Congress of 1978 will help to understand the trend.  
In 1978, Touré’s regime was gradually emerging from a decade of relative isolation, 
including political tensions with neighboring Senegal and Côte-d’Ivoire (which Guinea had 
accused of harboring anti-PDG Guinean exiles) and an extremely challenging Western 
embargo due, allegedly, to Guinea’s close ties to the Communist bloc and questionable 
human rights record. Indeed, in 1975, diplomatic relations were normalized with France. As 
a result, reconciliation was reached with the two Francophone neighbors in February 1978, 
and, in December of the same year, French President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing was 
scheduled for a state visit to Guinea (the first of its kind). In the heat of this “détente,” the 
PDG leadership undertook the highly publicized task of hosting a forum on the role of 
ideology in African politics and international relations under the theme “Africa on the 
Move.”  
Judging by its unusually inclusive nature, one can argue that the forum was chiefly 
designed to sell to international public opinion the regime’s new open-door policy without 
compromising its commitment to third world revolutionary ideology. Indeed, of the eighty-
three foreign delegations representing states, political parties, labor unions, national 
liberation movements, and international organizations, fifteen were representatives of 
Muslim nations including Algeria, Egypt, Gambia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Senegal, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen whose pronouncements were particularly well 
received by the Guinean National Islamic Council and Ministry of Islamic Affairs created 
two years earlier to further integrate Islam into the PDG political apparatus and further 
integrate Guinea into the international Islamic community. 
Thus, international panels endeavored to tie Islam to revolutionary socialist ideology 
as a uniting factor among political parties and states sharing this religion and this ideology. 
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This transpired from the allocutions of a number of delegates from Muslim socialist states. 
Malek Bachour of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Baath Party indicated, “The meeting of 
revolutionary ideological forces which the Democratic Party of Guinea has organized 
constitutes, from our point of view, a serious and effective opportunity to share our 
experiences, to expose and overcome the challenges posed to the national liberation 
movements and to the socialist Revolution in the third world by the imperialist forces and 
their agents” (Machour 1979: 3). On the same tone, the secretary general of the central 
committee of the Yemenite Socialist Party, Abdoul Fattahi Ismaël, stated, “The active 
political solidarity linking our parties and our peoples in their common struggle against 
imperialism and for the triumph of liberty, democracy, peace and socialism shall remain 
strong” (Ismaël 1979: 3).  
Still from the Islamic standpoint, the International Ideological Colloquium of 
Conakry was once and at the same time an occasion to ascertain anew the political unity of 
the world Muslim community against the enemies of Islam and Muslims everywhere. Dr. 
Mohamed Moatassine of the Moroccan Parliament expressed this when he stated, “Allow 
me, Mister President, from the height of this revolutionary tribune, to reiterate to our 
Palestinian brothers our total and constant support for their heroic and legitimate struggle 
against Zionism, agent of imperialism” (Moatassine 1979: 4). The Moroccan delegate also 
saluted President Touré for his contribution to the success of Islam:  
As a Muslim [Mister President], you have liberated our sacred 
Religion [sic] from charlatanism, fanaticism and the prejudices it has 
endured for centuries. In short, through a just and honest view of the 
Islamic principles, you are restoring our Religion’s authentic 
revolutionary dynamics and freeing it from the hold of exploiters and 
from those who oppress a fundamental pillar of our society, namely 
women. Did the Prophet Saidina Muhammad not say, ‘The way to 
Paradise is paved by the steps of mothers?’ (Moatassine 1979: 4-5).  
 
Following the colloquium and the National Congress, President Touré embarked, in 
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1979, on an unprecedented diplomatic shuttle which led him to Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait notably. Throughout these 
diplomatic missions, the Guinean leader emphasized his country’s longstanding “privileged 
relations” with the Arab world and unwavering support for the Palestinian people because of 
which his government was among the first in Africa to break diplomatic relations with Israel 
in the 1960s.  
As a result of the government’s heightened political and diplomatic engagement, oil-
rich nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, Iran and Libya provided much 
needed financial aid to Guinea. In addition, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Libya offered a number of scholarships, thus enabling Guinean students to pursue higher 
and vocational education in North Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
established the Dar al-Mal al-Islamiyya Bank in Conakry, while Libyan, Tunisian, Iraqi, 
Iranian, and Moroccan businesses opened in Conakry. 
Guinea’s policy of Islamic internationalization also materialized through President 
Touré’s increasingly active participation in Muslim organizations and programs in his 
cumulative capacities of first vice president of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
president of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Iran-Iraq War, and president of the Al-Quds 
Committee.  
Quite interestingly, Guinea’s increasing political respectability and diplomatic 
prestige among Muslim nation-states helped advance the Touré regime’s quest for warmer 
relations with the West so by the end of the regime Guinea was, for the first time since the 
1960s, enjoying meaningful bilateral relations with France, the United States and West 
Germany. Had President Touré’s untimely death not cancelled the twentieth Summit of the 
OAU scheduled for May 1984 in Conakry (which would have made him the executive 
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president of the OAU for the following annum), the Guinean leadership could have 
perfected its political, diplomatic, and economic rapports both on the African and global 
levels. 
Neo-Salafian Activism and Social Contradictions 
From the fall of the PDG regime in 1984, to the present, the role of Islam in 
Guinea’s experience in nation building and globalization has changed dramatically. For one 
thing, the long suppressed social-political contradictions having marked the twenty-six years 
of the PDG era surfaced among the country’s different ethnic, regional and religious 
components. With the disappearance of the national political party, which had somehow 
succeeded in maintaining a semblance of national unity, different and often opposing forces 
converged from within and abroad with conflicting agendas for what is termed “the 
reconstruction of post-Sékou Touré Guinea.”  
During the 1984-1991 period of absolute military rule of General Lansana Conté’s 
Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN), this soul-searching society underwent a 
confusing period of transition, and religion quickly became a potent force of mass 
mobilization and political protest. This shifted the status of Islam from a party-controlled 
and state-centered instrument of political power to a self-decentralizing energy henceforth 
set to galvanize grassroots popular forces. Thus, the so-called “traditional” or alsilamaaku 
Sufi-oriented establishment soon faced new forces advocating spiritual reform as a solution 
to Guinea’s growing political and economic problems. The revivalist movement of these 
“modern” forces also referred to as Wahhabi, which can be more accurately described as 
neo-Salafian activism relatively widespread in West Africa, was originally spearheaded by 
former students returning from North Africa and the Middle East and activists returning 
from neighboring West African countries such as Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Côte- 
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d’Ivoire where, unlike in Guinea, congregational Islam had flourished. 
It is not all clear whether this latest revivalist trend constitutes in any substantial way 
a continuation of the earlier neo-Salafian movement which was eventually forced into retreat 
by the PDG anti-sectarian policy and whose reformist campaign and anti-colonial activities 
in French West Africa are examined in Lansiné Kaba’s classic book (Kaba 1974).  In fact, 
observers find an elusive contrast between the two reformist movements in that despite its 
relative radicalism the earlier movement gave some credit to “traditional” Islamic creeds in 
West Africa while the later one discredits proponents of these creeds as spiritually corrupt.         
Observers also conceptualize the socio-religious frictions that the new trend of 
reformism has generated among Muslim Guineans as a contradiction between 
“traditionalists” and “modernists.” The problem with this approach is that it is based on the 
flimsy assumption that there exists somewhere something that qualifies as “pure Islam” 
compared to which anything else is at best “stained Islam.” Even though Islam has 
foundational precepts universally accepted by Muslims, the universality of the faith rests in 
large part upon the consciously acknowledged and celebrated diversity of the Ummah.  
“Diversity exists on various levels, including the exegetical, legal, theological, social, and 
political,” Seyyed Hossein Nasr points out before recalling this saying of the Prophet: “The 
difference of view among the scholars of my community is a blessing from God” (quoted in 
Sharma 1993: 431).   
What then qualifies the neo-Salafian reformists as “modernists?” What do 
proponents of this theory mean by “traditionalists” and “modernists?” What is the 
theological basis for such contradistinction? These problematic terms are applied differently 
to a variety of social-cultural and spiritual realities throughout the Muslim world, from 
Morocco to Indonesia. Nonetheless, Islamologists argue that because the Qur’an is known 
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and accepted as Allah’s unchanging revelation and the ultimate reference for settling any 
legitimate argument on faith, life, and the afterlife, Islam, the religion based upon this 
revelation, does not lend itself to any theological distinction between “traditional Islam” and 
“modern Islam.”  
Furthermore, if by modernism it is meant innovation, the simple fact that the so-
called Wahhabis oppose the incorporation of Sufism and indigenous African traditions does 
not necessarily make them innovators. On the contrary, insofar as their reformism is aimed 
at restoring what they hold as the integrity of Islam as preached and practiced by and under 
the Prophet Muhammad, thus following the puritanical example of Muhammad ibn 
Wahhab, they are conservative in essence. Indeed, “innovation” in the sense of bid ‘a, which 
is prohibited in Islam, is incompatible with the puritanical tenets of Wahhabiyya.   
 However, examined from the standpoint of the social-political history of Guinean 
society, the frictions between Wahhabiyya and Alsilaamaku are based less on theology than 
on practical societal issues such as the Wahhabis’ strong opposition to the existence of what 
they perceive as an oppressive hierarchy of karamokos (clerics) in parts of Guinea where there 
has long been a morbid attachment to social discrimination against relatively newly Islamized 
communities by descendants of earlier proselytizers. The reformists are also opposed to 
beliefs and practices ranging from levirate diktat (the tradition of remarrying a widow to the 
brother of her deceased husband) to maraboutism (talisman making, soothsaying, and spell 
casting).  
These contradictions have on occasions resulted in violent confrontations in recent 
years. Beyond its varied local manifestations, however, the pattern reveals a significant new 
facet of Guinea’s experience of Islamic globalization whereby the widespread availability of 
the Qur’an in languages other than Arabic (including French in this case) and the rapid 
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development of global transportation and communication technologies allow grassroots 
society to challenge traditional scholarship’s monopoly over religious knowledge. Since the 
mid-1980s, private Islamic bookstores and cultural clubs have proliferated throughout 
Conakry and other large cities. In addition, unlike the state-sponsored quotas of the PDG 
era, more and more Guineans have the opportunity to make the hajj (great pilgrimage) and 
umrah (lesser pilgrimage) to Mecca and to interact with Muslims of diverse cultural 
backgrounds and political leanings.  
Furthermore, beginning in the early 1990s, Guinea has been experiencing an 
increasingly aggressive campaign of evangelization by various Christian denominations from 
the United States and other Western nations targeting areas where the influence of Islam 
remains minimal. Some evangelical missionaries use material and financial rewards to attract 
followers from among indigent individuals while some (Neo-Apostolic missionaries notably) 
go as far as to profess toleration of polygamy and open mixture of animism and Christianity. 
Likewise, and perhaps in an effort to counter evangelization and secularism, unidentified 
Muslim organizations are pursuing an equally aggressive trend of recruitment of Wahhabi 
fellowship particularly among women of precarious conditions.  
Two main characteristics distinguish this trend of “Wahhabization.” First, judging by 
the dramatic change in the lifestyle of neophytes (former prostitutes and hitherto destitute 
women from broken families have suddenly shown signs of prosperity concomitant to their 
adoption of the Wahhabi public dress code and behavior), it is clear that whoever is behind 
it seems able and willing to invest abundantly in the endeavor. Second, the neophytes seem 
to be sworn to total secrecy as to the origin of their newfound wealth and puritanical 
piousness. Why are women in difficulty the primary target of this ongoing “Wahhabization?” 
Why so much secrecy among neophytes? Why are non-Wahhabi husbands of these 
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neophytes quick to resign to their so-called fate? 
Even though I have no evidence to substantiate widespread rumors among non-
Wahhabi locals suggesting that some of these new revivalists could be involved in drug 
trafficking, I would point out that in recent years a number of Guinean citizens have been 
arrested for drug trafficking abroad. Another rumor insinuates a possible tie between local 
revivalists and wealthy global terrorist organizations. On the other hand, there are those who 
speculate that in its aggressive “war on terror” the CIA could be playing one Wahhabi wing 
against another by financing the recruitment of needy and vulnerable Muslims for the 
purpose of injecting them into sleeper cells in this and other parts of the world. Proponents 
of this version indicate that observers have in fact wondered whether some of the activists 
are not connected to “jihadists” with whom they are known to have had contacts in nations 
such as Algeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (long-bearded Pakistani 
nationals appeared from time to time in mosques with local “ustaths,” teachers in the Arabic 
language, that is, in Conakry).  
Whatever the case, Guinean activists do not seem to mind being portrayed as 
supporters of the ideals of movements fighting for the “redemption of Islam.” Also, while 
many found “Operation Desert Storm” justified by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, 
most consider “Operation Iraqi Freedom” to be a calculated invasion of a Muslim nation by 
a non-Muslim force. This invasion, the sufferings of Palestinians under Israeli occupation, 
and America’s current harsh rhetoric toward other Muslim nations have lately prompted 
some of these activists, hitherto less vocal on such matters, to openly express admiration for 
Usama bin Laden’s challenge to America, referring to the Al-Qaeda leader as “Waare nden” 
(“The Beard” in Fulani), an expression generally reserved for heroes. The ongoing 
destabilization of occupied Iraq, the recent Israeli-Hesbullah war, and President Bush’s 
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utterance of the term “Islamic fascism” only add more fuel to this burning fire. However, 
there is no evidence linking these reformists to any terrorist network.  
What is evident is that Guinea has come a long way from the arch-disciplinarian 
PDG regime under whose watch the present twists and turns were practically unthinkable. 
Of course, one must also be mindful of the fact that the history of the world has been 
tremendously accelerated lately and that this acceleration has advantages and disadvantages 
for the whole world while arguably being more challenging for developing societies. Though 
reflective of the political, economic, and social-cultural transformation of Guinean society 
since independence, in that the current religious fervor swiping the nation is in large part a 
response to the mounting crisis addressed earlier, the new experience of Islamic 
globalization in Guinea is not simply a local prototype. It is also a part and parcel of a 
phenomenon of self-ascertainment growing among African Muslim communities across 
national boundaries. With contemporary Western theories and practices of globalization 
being widely criticized in Africa as yet another wave of neo-colonial policies and with 
Muslim Africans resenting what many consider to be an anti-Islamic new world order 
flooding the already marginalized continent, “traditionalists” and “modernists” seem to 
espouse the same vague ideal of a global Islamic revival, if not revolution, to restore the 
dignity and strength of the spiritual heritage of Muslims around the world. Both maintain 
that Islam is the only true response to the ongoing humiliation and exploitation of Muslim 
societies. In Usman Muhamad Bugaje’s words,  
The salvation of the African economy, from all that can be seen, 
cannot lie in the bloody and cruel hands of those who have sought to 
conquer, exploit and dominate Africa for the last five centuries or so. 
The meetings of the G-8 seem to be only distinguishable from the 
Berlin conference of 1884 in its sophistication, subtlety and efficacy. 
Nor can the future of Africa lie in the feeble and soiled hands of 
mercenary regimes, whose primary concern has never been the 
interest of their people, but the elusive game of self-perpetuation 
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which is pursued vigorously and recklessly until expiry of either the 
leader or the state that he heads…Africa’s only hope seem [sic] to lie 
with an inward looking, independent, confident, committed and 
courageous leadership, which so far only the Islamic movements 
seem capable of providing (Bugaje 1999).   
 
Conclusion 
 With an estimate 85 to 87 % Muslims ranking Guinea among the most Islamized 
nation-states of West Africa, I would argue that no study of this country’s past and present 
can be fully comprehensive without giving Islam its due consideration. Whether considered 
from the standpoint of early Mande and Fulani proselytism or the spiritual and political role 
of Islam in Guinean anti-colonial nationalism, or from that of the PDG ideological 
diplomacy or post-PDG self-decentralizing activism, Islam has played a central part in the 
delicate balance of statecraft/nation building and globalization.  
One can put Guinea’s case of Muslims’ experience of globalization in a more 
comprehensive historical perspective by pointing out with John O. Voll that although 
Islamic activist movements emerge from a particular set of circumstances, they are more 
often than not characterized by an intricate combination of territoriality and universality in 
that they do not occur in isolation from the rest of the world (Voll 1982: 3). Therefore, it 
matters little whether activism occurs in what is considered the core of the Muslim world or 
in what is considered its peripheries (West Africa, in this particular case). Nor does it matter 
much whether it is viewed as a local, regional, or global phenomenon. What matters the 
most are the motives, the agenda, and the methods which activists advocate under a given 
set of circumstances, and the consequential marks of their actions on their immediate and 
distant political and socio-spiritual environments. From this perspective, both the PDG 
state-centered Islamic internationalization and the present neo-Salafian revivalist/reformist 
movement can be envisioned as Islamic activism. 
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The politicization of Islam by the secular regime of the PDG through the merger of 
the country’s diverse Muslim forces under the National Islamic Council served this double 
purpose of nation building and globalization. While it is unclear in which direction of the 
dual endeavor the regime made its most lasting mark, one is inclined to suggest that this 
ideological single-party regime was able to effectively utilize Islam as a steppingstone toward 
ending its political and diplomatic isolation from the West. With the secretary general of the 
National Islamic Council also being the Minister of Islamic Affairs and head imam of the 
Great Faisal Mosque of Conakry (an infrastructure symbolizing the PDG institutionalized 
Islamic globalization built by Moroccans and financed by Saudi Arabia with $28 million), the 
state immersed the Islamic faith in a sea of ideology, thus utilizing its most effective asset to 
efficaciously connect with the Muslim world at large and benefit substantially from the 
global auspices of Islam.  
The current global crisis involving Islam as a prime target in the name of 
international security, as many Muslims see it, could not have come at a worse time for 
Guinea. The culture of rampant political corruption, poverty and revolving failure of 
governance having plagued General Lansana Conté’s regime has also transformed the 
country slowly but surely into a breeding ground for all forms of extremism. The causes of 
this dire state of affairs reside in a variety of factors not least of which is the Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ infamous Structural Adjustment Program, the shortsighted implementation of 
which suddenly produced an unprecedented volume of unemployment itself increasing 
exponentially as thousands of college graduates join each year this mass of left outs. These 
factors coupled with an anarchical opening of Guinea to the rest of the world have 
ultimately resulted in a rapid decline of hope and morality, lending a growing number of 
Guineans to questionable behavior. 
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I would, therefore, argue that neo-Salafian/Wahhabi activism is primarily aimed at 
Guinea’s political and economic crisis and secondarily at what is widely perceived as Western 
neo-colonial new world order and plundering of African resources while supposedly 
promoting democracy and free trade. It must be noted though that like Muridiyya in Senegal 
and Ahmadiyya in Sierra Leone, for instance, Wahhabiyya in Guinea is not intrinsically anti-
Western (though it is not exactly pro-Western either). In fact, some of this movement’s most 
vocal leaders are reported to have repeatedly uttered: “we are ‘anti-’ no one. We are anti-anti-
Islam and want only the welfare of our brothers and sisters in Islam here and around the 
world. Only those opposed to that welfare consider us to be anti-themselves.” Arguably, this 
in itself makes Wahhabi activism in this West African nation-state a local manifestation of 
contemporary global Islamic revivalism whose underlying aim is the restoration of what it 
views as Islam’s rightful authority over, and guidance for Muslims everywhere. This is 
perhaps what Voll means when he writes that Islamic activist movements do not occur in 
isolation and that they operate in the broader interactions of their time. 
On the other hand, however, just as nineteenth- and twentieth-century secularist 
anarchists shook Europe the way they did, twenty-first-century religious organizations with 
political agendas outside mainstream Islam, or whatever world religion for that matter, are 
predisposed to shake or even reshape the world. Such organizations have demonstrated their 
extraordinary ability to transmute from moderate to extremist national forces and, ultimately, 
to international underground movements willing to resort to violence, unless adequate 
measures are taken. Such measures must include objective acknowledgement of the real 
problems that religious activists seek to solve and rational distinction between terrorism and 
legitimate reformism. This means, for instance, that when the state is the problem, as is 
mainly the case in Guinea, proper recognition of the fact must be followed by concrete and 
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reasonable action of positive change.  
Viewed from the analytical perspective of Joel S. Migdal’s “strong society and weak 
state” paradigm, the history of religious activism, political change, and social contradictions 
in Guinea is once and at the same time an issue of “deterioration of old social control” and 
“transformation of social organizations into state institution” (Migdal 1988: 86-96). It is so in 
that it has repeatedly challenged and often weakened existing mechanisms of state control, 
thereby forcing the state to reengineer social organizations—religious movements in this 
particular case—which it more or less successfully transforms into state institutions or, at 
least, as new mechanisms of social control. Whether with French colonialism, West African 
“theocratic” aristocracies, Sékou Touré’s civilian autocracy or Lansana Conté’s military junta, 
Islamic activism has, from time to time, cornered the state in a position of crisis and 
reconsideration leading to what Migdal terms triangular accommodation for political 
survival. Such political acrobatics rarely produced positive social results and are more likely 
to generate far-reaching crises in correlation with the current international situation.  
International organizations and states, big and small, ought to face this historical fact 
realistically if lasting peace and security are to be restored. The emerging tendency to dismiss 
the historical relevance of the state in the name of globalization is at best a hypocritical 
argument and at worst an imperialistic doctrine. It is hypocritical because the dismissal 
applies mostly to the weaker states of the third world while at the same time the state in the 
developed world is undergoing an unprecedented consolidation in the name of security. It is 
imperialistic because the forced permeability of third world national borders to foreign 
interests whereby multinationals spearhead the mainly one-way economic traffic on the 
global highways differs from colonialism in form but not in substance. And yet, the same 
developed world is quick to “strongly urge” the states deemed obsolete to promote 
 28 
democracy, protect human rights and, most of all, cooperate with powers under assault in 
their “war on terror” because, as President George W. Bush enunciated it, “either you are 
with us or with the terrorists.”  
The fact is that only when the responsibility is assumed in a way which favors the 
formation of a truly international community (in lieu and place of the current bodies of 
superpower-manipulated venues reminiscent of post-World War II international clientelism) 
will national leaderships be able to responsibly address the real causes of religious extremism. 
Only then could the world enjoy healthy international relations and only then could it 
reverse the current freefall from the wasteful Cold War maneuvers to a dreadful Cold Peace 
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